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Resumo
O Dilema de Segurança no Sul da Ásia: Refor-
çando Arsenais e Vivendo com a Desconfiança
A Índia e o Paquistão estão envolvidos numa subtil 
competição estratégica e numa gradual corrida de 
armamentos onde inovações tecnológicas, moder-
nizações militares e crescentes arsenais nucleares 
aumentam os riscos para a estabilidade. O inves-
timento militar indiano é alimentado pela rivali-
dade estratégica com a China mas o ritmo de 
desenvolvimento torna o Paquistão crescentemente 
vulnerável; para reduzir o nível de disparidade, o 
Paquistão vira-se para a China – apesar desta estar 
disponível e ser capaz de aumentar a capa cidade 
estratégica paquistanesa – esta assistência não é 
suficiente para permitir ao Paquistão lidar com as 
diversas contingências das forças convencionais. 
Desta forma, Islamabad depende cada vez mais 
das armas nucleares para contrabalançar os dese-
quilíbrios de forças com a Índia. Neste dilema de 
segurança clássico, onde a competição se intensi-
fica e desconfiança mútua aumenta, o potencial 
para a emergência de uma crise militar no Sul da 
Ásia aumenta. A situação pede uma paz estrutural 
e uma arquitetura de segurança para iniciar uma 
détente e garantir uma estabilidade entre dois vizi-
nhos com armas nucleares. Na ausência de tal 
acordo, as consequências de uma competição secu-
ritária Índia-Paquistão sem restrições podem ir 
além do Sul da Ásia e afetar as regiões do Médio 
Oriente e Ásia-Pacífico.
Abstract
India and Pakistan are engaged in a subtle strategic 
competition and a gradual arms race where techno-
logical innovations, military modernizations, and 
growi ng nuclear arsenals are raising the stakes for sta-
bility. India’s military investment is driven by a stra-
tegic rivalry with China, but the pace of development 
finds Pakistan increasingly vulnerable to exploitation; 
to reduce the level of disparity, Pakistan turns to 
China, and though willing and able to bolster 
Pa kistan’s strategic capability, the assistance is not 
enough to enable Pakistan to meet multiple conven-
tional force contingencies. Islamabad therefore depends 
even more on nuclear weapons to offset its force 
imbalan ce with India. In this classic security dilemma, 
where competition is intensifying and mutual distrust 
is swelling, the potential for an outbreak of military 
crisis in South Asia is increasing. The situation 
demands a structured peace and security architecture 
to initiate détente and ensure stability between the two 
nuclear-armed neighbors. Without such an agreement, 
the consequences of an unchecked India-Pakistan secu-
rity competition could reverberate beyond South Asia 
into the Asia- Pacific and Middle East regions.
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Introduction
The strategic picture in South Asia remains grim and worrisome. Nearly 17 years 
have passed since India and Pakistan overtly displayed their nuclear capability to 
each other and the world, yet stability or a détente between the two neighbors 
remains elusive. Rather than pursue lasting peace, India and Pakistan have become 
hostage to negative perceptions and melodramatic fixations that have exacerbated 
a regional security competition.1
Faced with series of international sanctions and diplomatic isolation in the wake of 
the 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan assured the world that they would each 
pursue a minimum deterrence posture, avoid a debilitating arms competition, and 
take steps behooving of responsible nuclear stewardship. The international 
co mmunity believed, as did the domestic audience in both states, that the benefit of 
nuclear weapons in South Asia was to dissuade and deter conflict and enforce an 
Indo-Pakistani détente.
In contrast to that vision, mutual mistrust has deepened in both capitals despite the 
establishment of operational nuclear deterrents. Kashmir remains unresolved and 
a flashpoint for conflict, and the rise of religious extremism is reaching dangerous 
levels. Pakistan in particular is facing a grim situation; terrorists target not just the 
state institutions and military within the country, but have also struck repeatedly in 
India and Afghanistan.2 Acts of terrorism have brought several times India and 
Pakistan to the brink of war as allegations of Pakistan’s sponsorship for the acts 
have been levied by India.3 Equally, Pakistan alleges India’s abetment of insurgency 
in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, where a secessionist movement has increased in 
fervor and violence.
Individually, each struggles with its own issues. India is a rising power that seeks 
parity with its mightier neighbor China, even though it has been unable to resolve 
conflicts with its immediate neighbors—especially Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan 
endures both political instability and violent extremism that has metastasized 
aggressively in the past few decades. Pakistan also competes with India while 
balan cing the cost of building-up strategic arsenals against the persistent threat of 
military contingencies on its borders with India and Afghanistan.
1 This essay contains author’s personal views and does not represent U.S. Department of 
Defense, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) or the Pakistani government. 
2 At the time of this writing, a major terror attack on an Army Public School that killed innocent 
school children has resulted into an unprecedented resolve in the country to deal with the 
scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. 
3 In 2001–02, attacks on India parliament building and in November 2008 a daring terror assault 
in several locations in Mumbai was allegedly traced back to Pakistani territory which preci-
pitated major military crises. 
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The security competition between the two has lately intensified into a true nuclear 
arms race. India and Pakistan are both expanding fissile material production and 
introducing a suite of new nuclear-capable delivery systems, such as short-range 
battlefield nuclear weapons, sea-based variants, and higher-ranging ballistic missi-
les.4 Nuclear force developments and increased military procurements by both are 
not expected to lessen anytime in the foreseeable future, an eventuality that will 
only worsen the Indo-Pakistani mistrust in the coming years. In sum, after nearly 
seven decades of enduring rivalry, India and Pakistan are embroiled in a self-per-
petuating vortex of security competition that is driving South Asia closer to the 
brink of a nuclear conflict.
Outside of this regional stability dilemma, global power politics has recently shifted 
to three distinct regions: the Asia-Pacific, as United States “pivots” to the Far East; 
the Middle East, where violent extremist threats such as Daish, or Islamic State in 
Levant (ISIL), have emerged to compete for recruitment and terrorist hegemony 
with established groups like Al-Qaeda; and the Crimea/Ukraine region, where 
Russia has reasserted its muscle, resulting in a major crisis in 2014.
These tensions at the global system level are likely to have trickle-down effects in 
South Asia; in particular, the Asia-Pacific rebalance will inadvertently incentivize 
the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arsenal race. As China increases its defense spending 
in response to America’s pivot to Asia, India is consequently driven to develop 
and modernize its own strategic and conventional forces, including Agni interme-
diate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs). The reverberations of these actions continue as Western po wers, 
encouraging strategic congruity with “containing” China’s rise, feed India’s stra-
tegic ambition and tacitly endorse India’s military modernization and nuclear 
proliferation activities.
This policy is creating a classic security dilemma: India’s military’s investment 
finds Pakistan increasingly vulnerable to exploitation; Pakistan turns to China, 
which responds by bolstering Pakistan’s strategic capability, but still lacking the 
resources to compete with India’s conventional military advantage, Islamabad 
depends even more on nuclear weapons to offset the imbalance.
For nearly four decades, India and Pakistan have defied global norms and the 
nonpro liferation regime. Both states openly challenged this international commit-
ment to reduce the existence of nuclear weapons by overtly demonstrating their 
4 Since the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan has introduced eight nuclear-capable delivery systems, 
and India has responded with nine of its own. For both sides, missiles are becoming faster, 
deadlier, and more precise. Pakistan is improving its uranium extraction technology, boosting 
its fissile material production rates. Nuclear forces are moving to sea, by way of missile submari-
nes, for example the INS Arihant. In addition, Indian ballistic missile defenses are coming online. 
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respective nuclear capabilities in 1998. Since then, both countries have been deve-
loping operational deterrence force postures, new doctrines, and improved com-
mand and control systems, and soon, both countries will complete the third leg of 
the nuclear “triad” by fielding sea-based delivery systems. In a recent edited 
volu me, a well-known and widely respected South Asian scholar, Michael Krepon, 
states that India and Pakistan now possess more nuclear weapons delivery vehicles 
- including families of cruise and ballistic missiles - than the United States and 
Ru ssia (Krepon, 2013: 9).
On its part, the international community in the past, and especially in the wake of 
the 1998 tests, had explicitly desired to avoid an unhealthy arms race between India 
and Pakistan. But there never was any visible involvement of major powers to pre-
vent the upward spiral of India-Pakistan nuclear postures.
More recently, however, Western governments have displayed a different attitude 
towards South Asian nuclear capability. This is evidenced by the lucrative nuclear 
cooperation deal that was offered to India by the United States. Problematically, the 
denial of the same deal to Pakistan, the other nuclear weapons capable nation, left 
the region with little incentive to resolve conflicts. The mixed messages sent by the 
international community to the two nations, locked in a fully developed nuclear 
arms race, add yet another layer to the instability dilemma in South Asia. Integra-
ting the two states (and Israel) into the global non-proliferation regime is crucial for 
regional security and long-term international security in the 21st century.
This paper has three sections. The first section gives an overview and assessment of 
the trajectories of South Asia’s strategic postures. The second examines the geo-
graphical asymmetries as well as the evolving doctrines and its impact on command 
systems. The final section analyses the political and security dynamics that are caus-
ing tension and generating military competition. Finally, this paper concludes by 
offering some suggestions that could set stage for eventual peace and détente.
An Assessment of Strategic Trajectories in South Asia
India carried out its first nuclear device test in 1974, dubbing it “Smiling Buddha.” 
New Delhi’s characterization of this nuclear test as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” 
had few believers—especially across the border in Pakistan. After suffering defeat 
in the Bangladesh war, Pakistan, under the direction of President Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, began an uncompromising pursuit of the nuclear bomb. Faced with stiff 
resistance from Western nuclear technology suppliers and legal obstacles from an 
emerging non-proliferation regime, Pakistan resorted to procuring essential nuclear 
components by any means, legitimate, or illicit.5
5 A comprehensive history of Pakistani nuclear program is covered in Feroz Hassan Khan (2012). 
Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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For the next quarter of century, India and Pakistan produced fissile material and 
developed delivery capability at a steady pace. Both denied existence of a military 
nuclear program until 1998 when each conducted nuclear explosive tests and 
declared themselves as nuclear capable states. As the new century dawned, both 
states had a few dozen weapons in their inventory, although operational employ-
ment capability was nascent at best. Within a year of the tests, however, India and 
Pakistan were involved in a short war on the Line of Control (LoC) in the northern 
areas of the disputed Kashmir region (Kargil Crisis). Like other engagements in the 
past, this military crisis was eventually diffused through U.S. diplomatic interven-
tion but not until after an intense short battle that caused hundreds of casualties. 
This unfortunate short war gave birth to innovative military doctrines and set 
South Asia on a pathway of adversarial policy and further crises.6
In the first decade after nuclear tests, the region saw unprecedented acts of terro-
rism and more military crises. During the same period, international focus on South 
Asia intensified after the September 11, 2001 terror attack in the United States. U.S. 
and NATO forces became deeply mired in military operations in Afghanistan as 
part of the “Global War on Terror.”
In the post 9/11 environment, four major events and policy shifts made a huge 
impact on the strategic dynamics in the South Asian region. First, in 2001–2002 
India and Pakistan came close to a full-scale war following militant attacks on the 
Indian parliament building in New Delhi. This act of terrorism touched off a 
10-month standoff that was again diffused with intense U.S. diplomatic interven-
tion. Second, in 2004, the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network was busted, 
which placed Pakistan in the international spotlight and irreparably damaged its 
reputation. Third, within a year of that dramatic episode, the U.S. offered an excep-
tional nuclear deal to India, allowing civilian nuclear trade, while retaining its mili-
tary’s program.
The deal was legislated into U.S. law in 2008 by the Hyde Act, which indirectly 
conferred de-facto recognition of a non-Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member to 
maintain and enhance its military nuclear program. The Hyde Act alienated 
Pa kistan, which at the time, was a front line state in the war against terror in neigh-
boring Afghanistan. Finally, in November 2008 another spectacular terrorist attack, 
this time in Mumbai, was traced back to Pakistan and wrecked any prospects of 
peace and stability in the region. This incident derailed five years of backdoor peace 
negotiations that had begun in 2003 between India and Pakistan.
These four events propelled Indo-Pakistani rivalry into a deeper mistrust. As the 
United States began to reprimand Pakistan both publicly and privately, security 
6 For a comprehensive study of Kargil War see Peter R. Lavoy (ed.) (2009). Asymmetric War in South 
Asia: The Causes and Consequence of the Kargil Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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anxieties in Pakistan reached new levels. In 2011, a series of incidents heightened 
Pakistan’s sense of isolation and brought U.S.-Pakistan relations to an all-time low: 
the murder of Pakistani citizens by a U.S. intelligence contractor; a spectacular raid 
deep inside Pakistan that found the most-wanted man Osama bin Laden hiding in 
plain site; and a November border incident in which 24 Pakistani officers and men 
were killed in a mistaken U.S attack from Afghanistan.
A Race for Fissile Material Stocks
Pakistani nuclear bureaucracy is convinced that the fissile material gap with India 
is widening, even more so after the U.S.-India nuclear deal. It believes that India 
could divert its domestic uranium resources toward the military nuclear program 
while uranium fuel imported to the civilian component will compensate for the 
energy requirements.7 Furthermore, Pakistan claims that India took the lead in 
fissi le material production in 1974 while Pakistan faced nonproliferation obstacles 
and had to defy international efforts before it could acquire fissile material produc-
tion capability. These perceptions, along with an evolving Indian military doctrine, 
have galvanized Pakistani fissile material production. Pakistan simply dismisses 
the notion that it maintains the fastest growing arsenals in the world. In reality, both 
India and Pakistan have stepped up fissile production capacities, in part, as psy-
choses of strategic competition but also to meet the fissile material requirements of 
the induction of new delivery systems in their respective arsenals.8
At the time of the 1998 tests, Pakistan had only one plutonium production reactor 
at Khushab, but as of 2015, three more are functioning and a fourth is soon to be 
commissioned. Pakistan is famously known for its prowess in producing highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) since the early 1980s. By now, Pakistan has expanded its 
HEU program with new-generation gas centrifuges (P-3 and P-4) that have been 
installed at Kahuta while also increasing the uranium hexafluoride production 
capacity at the chemical plant complex at Dera Ghazi Khan.9 Open-sources estimate 
7 Under the terms of the deal, India was required to separate its civil and military nuclear 
installa tions and submit the civil sites to IAEA safeguards. In return, India was granted permis-
sion to import nuclear fuel and technology despite being non-party to the NPT. This meant that 
India could now divert indigenously produced fuel to military uses. 
8 According to the 2013 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal comprises 90 to 110 warheads. Estima-
tes in 2012 put India’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile at 2.4 ± 0.9 metric tons, and its 
weapons-grade plutonium stockpile at 0.54 ± 0.18 metric tons. “Summary,” in SIPRI Yearbook 
2013: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Stockholm: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2013); “India,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, 4 February 
2013, available at http://www.fissilematerials.org/countries/india.html.
9 Author’s interview with Dr. Javed Mirza, former head of Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) 
for the book Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb in June 2007.
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that as of 2012, Pakistan produced 3 ± 1.2 metric tons of HEU and 0.15 ± 0.05 metric 
tons of plutonium—enough to produce one to two dozen weapons per year (Inter-
national Panel on Fissile Materials, 2013). Other sources indicate that Pakistan is 
currently believed to have 90–110 warheads (Kimball and Collina, 2014).
With the fourth plutonium production reactor coming on line, Pakistani fissile pro-
duction capacity will rise even further. Pakistan also has the option to produce 
composite or hybrid warheads with deuterium-tritium boosters. Because Pakistan 
does not enjoy the benefit of external uranium supplies—like India—the possibility 
exists for a crunch in uranium supplies caused by demand from both civil and 
military program requirements. This has driven increased exploration of uranium 
ores within Pakistan’s territories. Pakistan’s annual production of natural uranium 
is also likely to receive a boost once newly discovered uranium mines at Shanawa 
are operational.10
Given these developments and it sense of discrimination after the American nuclear 
deal to India, Islamabad opposes the commencement of international negotiations 
on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and has instead demanded that nego-
tiations include the accountability of the fissile stocks of all stakeholders—what it 
calls a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT). Pakistan contends that the FMCT fails to 
address the asymmetry of existing stocks and would freeze Pakistan’s disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis India.11
Quest for Strategic Triad
India has embarked on an ambitious strategic modernization program. Its strategic 
forces are developing capabilities to project power. Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh inaugurated the first nuclear powered boat, the Arihant-class ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN), in July 2009 at Visakhapatnam and declared that India was 
jo ining the elite club of nations equipped with nuclear submarines (Economic 
Times, 2009). This was followed by trials and tests of SLBMs such as the 
700km-range K-15 Sagarika, whose development trials were said to have been com-
pleted in January 2013 (Defence News India, 2013). India also has plans to field the 
K-4 IRBM, which is designed to launch from the Arihant-class SSBN and carry a 
1,000kg nuclear warhead. Each Arihant-class submarine would be able to carry 
10 Shanawa was expected to open in 2014, which will increase the annual capacity from approxi-
mately 36 to 54 metric tons. International Panel on Fissile Materials (2010). Global Fissile Mate-
rial Report 2010: Balancing the Books: Production and Stocks, available at http://fissilematerials.
org/library/gfmr10.pdf, p. 127.
11 For details, see “The South Asian Nuclear Balance: An Interview with Pakistani Ambassador to 
the CD Zamir Akram” Arms Control Today, December 2011, available at http://www.armscon-
trol.org/act/2011_12/Interview_With_Pakistani_Ambassador_to_the_CD_Zamir_Akram.
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12 K-15 missiles, which would later be replaced by the 3,500km-range K-X. Three 
Arihant-class SSBNs are currently under construction—one at Visakhapatnam and 
two in Vadodara, India (Naval-Technology, 2013).
Another major program is the 5,000km Agni-V, a solid-fuelled and intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) that is slated to be operational by 2015. The Indian scientists 
have also claimed that Agni-V would be equipped with multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) that are capable of penetrating enemy missile 
defenses (Pandit, 2012). In the spring of 2013, India conducted flight tests of the 
290-km range, supersonic submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) BrahMos. 
Indian scientists declared that the system would be “ready for fitment on subma-
rines in vertical launch configuration.” (Press Trust of India, 2013). Along with these 
offensive long-range delivery systems, India is also actively developing ballis tic 
missile defenses (BMD).
On the other side of the border, Pakistan’s strategic force trajectory is towards 
shorter- and medium-range accuracies, as well as development of countervailing 
capabilities that complicate India’s conventional force modernization plans, 
pene trate missile defenses, and force India to undertake unacceptable risks. 
Pa kistan does not seek power projection but, rather, a regional stalemate. The cur-
rent inventory comprises various short-range and medium-range ballistic and 
cruise missiles.12 Pakistan is also developing a sea-based deterrent. In 2012, it 
fo rmally inaugurated its Naval Strategic Forces Command. The sea-based deli-
very is reported to likely comprise Agosta-class submarines armed with nuclear-
tipped cruise missiles.13
The aforementioned delivery systems will sooner or later get into a deployment 
cycle, especially once sea-based deterrent are employed on deterrence patrol in the 
Indian Ocean. Furthermore, India’s pursuit of BMD for its command and commer-
cial centers will putatively challenge the Pakistani nuclear deterrent capability in a 
future crisis. Pakistan is likely to embark on countervailing strategies, which will 
include both active and passive measures. This response may well include the 
increase of Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missile stocks and may even drive the 
development of MIRV capabilities to penetrate Indian defenses. The South Asian 
fissile and missile race could pose new challenges to the fragile stability in South 
Asia. Overlaid with these emerging capabilities are factors such as asymmetric 
12 The types of missiles are the following: Hatf-1A Hatf-II (Abdali), Hatf-III (Ghaznavi), Hatf-IV 
(Shaheen-1, Shaheen-1A), Hatf-V (Ghauri), Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2), Hatf-VII (Babur), Hatf-VIII 
(Ra’ad), and Hatf-IX (Nasr). For further details see Feroz Hassan Khan (2012). Op. Cit., p. 250.
13 For details of Pakistan’s strategic forces, see Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris (2011). 
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 67, no. 4, available at 
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/4/91.full.pdf+html.
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geography, regional power structures, and evolving military doctrines in the region 
that complicates strategic stability.
Geographical Asymmetries and Evolving Military Doctrines
South Asia’s strategic geography changed after the 1971 war when a united 
East-West Pakistan was dismembered. This was a watershed event in the history of 
the region as it constituted a second partition of the subcontinent and also changed 
the character of strategic rivalry in South Asia.14 The results of the war cemented the 
Pakistani perception that India was bent on destroying Pakistan, and it gave cre-
dence to the belief that if presented with the opportunity, India would use its 
stronger conventional force to finish the task. The Indian demonstration of nuclear 
capability in 1974 then completely tilted the strategic imbalance in favor of India. 
This status was unacceptable to Pakistan. Not only would Islamabad subsequently 
doggedly pursue nuclear capability, it would also come to master asymmetric 
war—this latter convention occurring thanks to Pakistan’s adjacent position to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the response of Western-backed forces “jihad” 
against communism.
After the defeat of the ‘71 War and under duress, Pakistan signed a peace accord 
with India at Simla in 1972. This led to a decade’s worth of relative peace between 
the two countries, but three events changed the regional dynamics and transformed 
security landscape by the early 1980s: the Islamic revolution in Iran; the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan; and the return of Prime minister Indira Gandhi—who had 
led India to victory in 1971 war—to political power in India.15 The first two events 
allowed General Zia-ul- Haq’s military’s government to exploit Pakistan’s geopo-
litical significance as the international community looked for partners to contain 
both crises.
As for Mrs. Gandhi’s India, it began showcase a new political and military tact to 
deal with Pakistan that at the time was spearheading a global jihad against the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan. New Delhi revived its strategic partnership with the 
Soviet Union, while the Indian military commenced a new strategic plan to engage 
Pakistan in a conventional war that would further weaken the smaller force and 
preemptively destroy Pakistan’s nascent nuclear program. This thinking was com-
14 Pakistan was born with insecure and contested border and with two wings separated by thou-
sand miles of India in between its two fronts with India and western porous border with 
Afghanistan, which created multiple fronts to defend. With East Pakistan now independent 
Bangladesh, Pakistan had only one front to defend with India. 
15 Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s political party was ousted from power in the 1977 election after she had 
declared a controversial emergency. For the first time in India, a different political party was set 
up, and it lasted until 1980. 
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monly referred to as the Sunderji doctrine.16 But India’s strategic aims could not 
materialize because of the regional and global circumstances, and by the end of the 
1980s, a nuclear weapons program was budding in Pakistan.
The beginning of the 1990s saw the end of the Soviet Union, and as the dissolving 
Soviet Union retreated out of Afghanistan, the regional circumstances changed sig-
nificantly. The early 90s also saw the Kashmir uprising at its peak with full support 
from Pakistan, and as U.S. interest in the region diminished with the Soviet retreat, 
both Pakistan and India came under nuclear sanctions and pressure to roll back 
their nuclear programs. By the end of the century, with both India and Pakistan 
conspicuously nuclear capable, the nature of war had sub-conventional or proxy 
dimensions intertwined with the conventional implications, all overlaid with 
nuclear deterrence.17
In theory, the advent of a nuclear deterrent ought to have created a semblance of 
strategic balance. But rather than bringing stability, a short intense war occurred in 
Kargil in the summer of 1999, dashing any prospect of peace. In 2001, a 10-month 
military stand-off tested the presence of the nuclear deterrent after alleged terro rists 
from two Pakistani-based organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed) 
attacked the Indian parliament building in New Delhi.18
The 2001-2002 crisis also tested India’s military concept of limited war under the 
nuclear umbrella. The military mobilization concept originally conceived in the 
1980s was somewhat redundant. India’s political leadership ordered the army to 
mobilize and threaten Pakistan in retaliation of the attack on the Indian parliament, 
but its mobilization took several weeks to reach the border allowing Pakistan to 
16 The architect of strategic thinking was India’s army chief General K. Sundarji, who first reorga-
nized India’s army military and created such offensive force designed to fight a swift battle to 
sever Pakistan in two and destroy the country’s nascent nuclear capability. The Indian army 
conducted several exercises in the mid-1980s to perfect this concept, one of which resulted in a 
major military crisis in 1986–1987 (Exercise Brasstacks). In the 1980s, Pakistan and the United 
States were jointly waging an asymmetric war in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviet occupation. 
Therefore, Pakistan was in a state of war at its western border when the Indian military initia-
ted Brasstacks.
17 India and Pakistan have a history of waging asymmetric war against the other, which involves 
use of proxies or abetting secessionism since the two became independent countries. Since 
1947-48, all wars fought between the two involved uses of sub-conventional elements wherein 
exploiting domestic instability combined with the conventional military invasion. Pakistan 
tried in 1965 but failed to attain objectives; India successfully exploited Pakistan’s internal 
chaos in East Pakistan before invasion in the 1971 War. In the 1980s, Pakistan refined sub-con-
ventional strategy after a decade of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the help of United 
States and other Western powers. Pakistan then applied its mastery when Kashmir secessionist 
uprising surfaced after the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan 
18 All militants that attacked the Indian parliament in December 2001 were killed in the fire-fight.
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quickly counter-mobilize due to shorter lines of communication from peace garri-
sons to battlefield locations. The Indian military remained on the border for 10 
months while political leadership could not decide on approving military opera-
tions across the border. By then, once again, Pakistan was playing a front-line role 
in America’s war on terror in Afghanistan. Pakistan could neither be isolated 
di plomatically nor could Indian leadership risk a nuclear war. Pakistan showcased 
its nuclear prowess by flight-testing some of its nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. 
The new realities had outmoded the erstwhile Sunderji doctrine. India’s military 
pl anners now began to contemplate new ways of fighting a limited war against 
nuclear-armed Pakistan.
The new Indian approach, dubbed as the military doctrine of “Cold Start,” proposed 
both rapid mobilizations to undercut Pakistani mobilization and limited operation 
in order to keep below the Pakistani nuclear threshold. The doctrine’s end-state is 
war termination before the international community could intervene. India’s pro-
active military operational concept envisaged heavy use of firepower combined with 
air operations, ground operations, and a naval blockade of the solitary Pakistani port 
of Karachi. Over a decade since the 2002 standoff, the Indian army has been reorga-
nizing its army formations into division-sized forces known as Integrated Battle 
Groups (IBGs). These IBGs are purpose built to strike across the international border 
at short notice. The IBGs would also create space for follow-on forces to undertake 
limited exploitation via shallow maneuver, while inflicting maximum destruction of 
Pakistani military. Indian planners assume that speed of operations and a shallow 
ingress will not allow Pakistan to bring its nuclear deterrence into play.
Pakistan then commenced a refinement of its own military doctrines to respond to 
India’s innovation. Pakistan reinforced its garrisons at vulnerable locations, created 
quick reaction forces that could rapidly deploy, and improved and constructed a 
series of obstacles to delay and channelize India forces. In 2011, the Pakistan army 
released a doctrine called “Comprehensive Response” that elaborated its predi-
cament in the following words: “With the possibility of Pakistan being drawn into 
a war at very short notice, all formations organize their administrative and routine 
activities in a manner that effective combat potential can be generated within 24 to 
48 hours from the corps to unit level and two to three days at the Army level.” 
(Pakistan Army Doctrine and Evaluation Directorate, 2011: 43-44). In addition to 
decreasing its own mobilization timelines, Pakistan could also launch a tactical 
offensive to take its battle into Indian territory either preemptively or as riposte to 
Indian attack.
While both India and Pakistan refined their conventional doctrines, Pakistani stra-
tegic planners were working to integrate their conventional force plans with nuclear 
force plans. Pakistan’s predicament was its vulnerability to India by a geographical 
handicap of shallow depth. Additionally, Pakistan’s main lines of communication 
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were close and vulnerable to an Indian offensive, a weakness that the original 
Indian doctrine was slated to exploit. But by end of the first decade of the twenty-
first century Pakistan was facing multiple insurgencies of its own, especially on its 
Western borders, where its troops were drawn into counterinsurgency operations 
in the tribal areas. Pakistani defenses against India were weakening as forces from 
the Indian border and Line of Control in Kashmir were drawn to the border with 
Afghanistan. Pakistan then sought to find answer to its strategic predicament. One 
option was to integrate nuclear weapons into conventional war plans.
In the spring of 2011, still facing inherent geographic handicaps in a conflict with 
India, Pakistani military planners found an answer to the India’s Cold Start doc-
trines. In April 2011, Pakistan tested the Hatf-IX/Nasr, a 60km-range, road-mobile 
short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), also dubbed as Nasr. The press statement 
accompanying the introduction of this new system by Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Public Relations (ISPR) directorate stated that Nasr “carries nuclear warheads of 
appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes.”19
Pakistan had made it clear that India’s Cold Start doctrine would result into me eting 
a nuclear weapon in the battlefield and that the onus of lowering of the nuclear 
threshold rests with the India. In theory, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapon 
(TNW) would deny India the space to prosecute a conventional war under the 
nuclear overhang. India then introduced its own SRBM, Prahaar with a test that 
follo wed within months; however, India did not declare its system as explicitly car-
ried nuclear warheads but kept it ambiguous. Later, its scientific organizations 
declared that Prahaar was to replace the aging Privthi missiles that were first 
introdu ced in the 1980s. Prahaar has 50–150km-striking range and is likely having 
dual-use mission given India’s claims to have tested compact warhead designs 
(Raghuvanshi, 2011).
The induction of battlefield nuclear weapons in South Asia opened up the litany of 
questions of the Cold War era whose clear answers were never found. Some five or 
six decades back when weapons as Davy Crocket and nuclear artillery were 
deployed in the mix of conventional forces in the East-West conflict, NATO forces 
weighed the deterrent effect of such weapons against the operational and logistic 
dilemma they faced. The appearance of short-range nuclear capable delivery sys-
tems in the battlefield poses imminent threats inducing preemptive strikes from the 
adversary. Second, TNW forward deployment in the proximity of conventional 
defenses complicates articulation of command and control (C2). Conversely, an 
assertive C2 makes the deployed weapon relatively safe from accidental use but 
less battle effective and more vulnerable, once out of the peacetime storage. More 
19 Pakistan Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate, Press Release No. PR94/2011-ISPR, April 
19, 2011, available at https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721.
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importantly, the vulnerability of the weapons in the field warrants extra security 
measures to protect them, which then compromises the requirements of camou-
flage and concealment. These are some of the deployment and employment challen-
ges of operational integration of conventional and nuclear forces, especially with 
the induction of short-range nuclear capable system into the mix.
Doctrinal Asymmetry
India and Pakistan adapted differing nuclear doctrine. Unlike Pakistan, India has 
an official nuclear doctrine of no first use (NFU). India’s NFU has several qualifiers 
such as its right to retaliate massively if Indian forces were attacked with nuclear 
weapons anywhere -whether its own or on foreign territory. India would also reta-
liate with nuclear weapons if chemical, or biological weapons were used against 
Indian forces. Pakistan decided to showcase its command and control apparatus 
and decided it was not necessary to declare a doctrine. Pakistani official position is 
to keep the right of first use open. Islamabad does not believe in the credibility of 
India’s massive retaliation threat against nuclear attack. In addition, Pakistan’s 
nuclear doctrine is deliberately ambiguous and it’s belief that the more imprecise 
nuclear thresholds are the greater are the chances of complicating and paralyzing 
Indian conventional military plans.
Furthermore, the closest Pakistan has come to declaring the parameters of its 
nuclear use doctrine was in an interview in which SPD Director-General Khalid 
Kidwai declared four general conditions that would contribute to Pakistani deci-
sion for nuclear use. Pakistani official declared that Pakistan would consider use of 
nuclear weapons, if India: (1) conquers a large portion of territory; (2) destroys 
large portions of Pakistani armed forces; (3) strangles the economy; or (4) threatens 
regime survival through domestic destabilization.20 From the Pakistani officials 
statements it can be clearly discerned that the foremost aim of Pakistani nuclear 
doctrine is to deter a conventional force attack against Pakistan and that it would 
retain all options - including use of nuclear weapons as a last resort- to ensure its 
national integrity and survival.
This doctrinal mismatch between India and Pakistan has potential risks. India’s 
assumption is that should it start a limited war by sending IBGs across the interna-
tional border, Pakistan would be deterred for fear of punishment because in the 
event of Pakistani nuclear use India would “massively retaliate” - thus Pakistan 
would be unable to think of employing nuclear weapons. In contrast, the Pakistanis 
dismiss the credibility of India’s massive retaliation policy. Pakistan believes India 
20 Khalid Kidwai (Pakistan’s former Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division), interview 
by the Landau Network-Centro Volta, February 2002, available at http://www.pugwash.org/
september11/pakistan-nuclear.htm.
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would not be able to consider such a disproportionate response against low yield 
tactical strikes. After all, India and Pakistan lie on the same subcontinent and both 
have the ability to retain enough survivable weapons to retaliate. As both sides 
believe in second strikes capacities, neither side feels it has reasons to back away. 
With increasing arsenals and modernizations of systems, neither country is ready 
to give up or back down.
The Drivers of Competition
At the root of this nuclear and doctrinal competition is mutual mistrust. Several 
factors have contributed to such an outcome. Pakistan’s strategic anxieties com-
pounded when the busting of A. Q. Khan network lead to international scorn. To 
add insult to this injury was the increased U.S.-India strategic partnership that 
included an exceptional nuclear deal. At the regional level, there was virtually no 
progress in any meaningful arms control and confidence-building measures that 
could bring in some semblance of peace and security. India found no incentive to 
deal to cut any slack for Pakistan. While series of terror attacks continued in both 
countries, attacks in India that could be traced back to Pakistan became a sore 
stickin g point for India to keep up pressure on Pakistan. India continues to demand 
that Pakistan dismantle terror networks and bring to justice all perpetrators—espe-
cially the ones involved in the 2008 Mumbai terror attack. Pakistani is suffering 
itself as terror attacks with impunity continues in the country at the time of this 
writing and the judicial system in Pakistan cannot provide speedy justice in the 
absence of full cooperation and evidence from India. With the recent change of 
government in India that has enabled a right-wing Hindu party in power, Pa kistanis 
have little hope that any step they could take would satisfy India.21 The regional 
strategic environment in the end remains politically charged and ever prone to 
su dden crisis.
The Nuclear Deal
Pakistan was placed under international spotlight and infamy when it’s chief scien-
tist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, was found in the center of the international prolife-
ration ring that was busted in the Fall of 2003. A. Q. Khan was the head of the 
Pakistani centrifuge program, and he admitted to his role in the illicit network that 
provided nuclear technology to several countries, including Iran, Libya, and North 
21 India cancelled peace talks with Pakistan last summer (2014) on the grounds that Pakistan had 
carried out dialogue with Kashmiri leaders prior to the talks. Since then there is no dialogue at 
any level; meanwhile, tensions on the Kashmir Line of Control have increased and often turn 
violent, especially when Pakistani military is conducting operations on the Western frontiers 
against Taliban. 
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Korea. Pakistan has never recovered from the fallout of the A. Q. Khan saga. For 
over a decade now, Pakistan has persistently denied any official complicity and has 
tried hard to overcome the scarlet letter of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network. 
Pakistan has willing shared its investigations with international community though 
it did not allow access to outside interrogation of A. Q. Khan, which it is unlikely to 
grant given that he is seen as national hero and that he still holds classified infor-
mation about Pakistan’s nuclear program. Despite Pakistani help to dismantle the 
network and having taken significant steps to tighten its nuclear security regime, it 
image remains tainted of the baggage of the network.22
Pakistan’s struggle to recover from the fallout of the A. Q. Khan debacle only com-
pounded when its archrival and fellow proliferator India was showered with an 
exceptional and lucrative nuclear deal. Just a year after the unfolding of the A. Q. 
Khan network, President George Bush offered India a nuclear deal with the United 
States. Three years later, this deal was legislated in Washington as the Hyde Act 
2008. India was granted a waiver from the export controls of the Nuclear Supplier’s 
Group (NSG), which permitted India to freely import nuclear fuel and technology 
for civilian purposes, while freeing up its domestic uranium resources for India’s 
military’s program. As for its terms, India agreed to open its civilian sites to inspec-
tion from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but not its military sites that 
are permitted to operate. This controversial deal implied a de facto recognition of 
non-NPT member.
India was seemingly rewarded because its image of external proliferation was 
clean, but in reality the deal was aimed at providing significant nuclear business for 
United States and other Western suppliers.23 India’s status as an emerging power 
with democratic credentials and its rivalry with China are long-term reasons for 
this special treatment. The consequence of this deal was alienation of Pakistan and 
China and setting up the precedence and added incentive for further cooperation 
between the two. Pakistani calculations of India’s fissile stocks were significantly 
altered. Islamabad contends it is now compelled to step up production of fissile 
material and now is opposed to the negotiations of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. 
Pakistan wants a similar deal what it calls “mainstreaming” Pakistan into the 
nuclear world order, but the United States has persistently refused to oblige Isla-
mabad’s wishes.
As Indian diplomacy gears up towards getting membership in the Nuclear Suppli-
ers Group NSG, Pakistani frustration and anger is on the rise. Pakistan has made it 
22 See the latest National Threat Initiative (NTI) Index of 2014. 
23 Proponents of the U.S.-India nuclear deal cite India’s “clean” nonproliferation record but deli-
berately ignore or gloss over India’s abuse of Atoms for Peace that resulted in the 1974 nuclear 
test and set the chain of proliferation. 
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clear the unacceptability of such a position. Pakistan believes this move will kill 
Pakistani chances of becoming member of the club. It is hoping China and some 
other members would not allow this discrimination. Additionally, the Pakistanis 
claim that they have paid the penalty for the A. Q. Khan folly and it is time to move 
forward. They are asking for criteria-based approach to membership in export 
co ntrol regimes rather than providing membership based on political favoritism. 
We stern disregard of Pakistani sense of isolationism is counterproductive in 
strengthening global non-proliferation regime. The consequence of this policy is 
that Pakistan, with advanced nuclear capabilities, is left out of the nuclear system. 
Furthermore, as it increases its arsenals, there is no regional or local architecture 
that dampens the competition because India has no incentive to engage in any 
CBMs or restraint talks with Pakistan.
Absence of Meaningful CBMs or Arms Control Architecture
After the nuclear tests in 1998, there were concerted efforts to bring some restraint 
agreement in the region. United States spearheaded an effort in 1998-99 but that 
effort failed to engage India into strategic restraint agreement. India was dismissive 
because it believes China is India’s nemesis and India is global player and would 
not be tied to the region. Nevertheless, both countries found common grounds on 
at least one promising political framework that was signed by India and Pakistan 
in Lahore in 1999 known as the Lahore Agreement. The Lahore Declaration of 
Februa ry 1999, for example, was a celebrated bilateral agreement in which India 
and Pakistan promised to resolve disputes peacefully in good faith, improve bila-
teral dialogue, and avoid nuclear provocation; however, three months later, 
Pa kistani soldiers snuck across the line of control in Kashmir and occupied aban-
doned Indian posts, sparking the Kargil War. Several attempts to revive that spirit 
were made but have never reached fruition.
By and large, South Asia has a long history of developing confidence-building 
measures but was always shy of serious arms control issues. All peace related dia-
logue has remained in a state of limbo since the 2008 Mumbai attack. There lingers 
a persistent belief that CBMs are ineffectual for easing crisis and dissuading con-
flict. India and Pakistan do not have any agreement to limit conventional force 
expansion, nor is there any desire to limit delivery system development or fissile 
material production.
Conclusion
South Asia continues to defy the global trends and their competition is a major 
challen ge for international security. Some 40 years back when the nonproliferation 
regime was in nascent stages, both countries interpreted the global norm as a 
challen ge to national security with India calling it global nuclear apartheid. Now, 
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India and Pakistan are seen in different leagues. Their respective nuclear programs 
and motivations are at variance, much more intense than anytime in history and the 
fundamentals of their motivations are much different than when the two com-
menced their nuclear journey.
While nuclear arsenals and delivery means are increasing with innovative doctri-
nes replacing redundant ones, the India-Pakistani relations remain tense and con-
flicts unresolved. The intense involvement of the United States after 9/11 is shifting 
away from South Asia towards rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific and other global 
contingencies. This development will have a cascading effect on South Asia. China 
will continue to remain the focus, and it is already investing heavily in its strategic 
weapons system development, including modernizing its missile systems and 
naval outreach. Moreover, India is reacting to China with its military investments, 
which has an impact on Pakistan. Facing multiple threats from within and lacking 
resources to match India’s military buildup, Pakistan is relying heavily on nuclear 
weapons. The security dilemma on the subcontinent continues to intensify. This 
trend could only reverse if and when visionary leadership emerges that could see 
the dangers of this security dilemma.
Seemingly there is no initiative to ease Indo-Pakistani strategic conundrum. The 
plethora of CBMs is merely on the books, but there is no robust arrangement for 
bilateral strategic restraint. The author has proposed several arms control proposals 
in recent publications.24 One such opportunity for rudimentary arms control mea-
sure still exists if and when Indians and Pakistanis would come to the bargaining 
table. Pakistan and India can decommission their aging and obsolete SRBMs (the 
Hatf-I and Privthi-I, respectively). If both could jointly agree to disassemble these 
missiles in a transparent manner, this could constitute as first baby step of inspiring 
new level of mutual confidence and serve as a harbinger for future arms control in 
the region.25
Some hopes were pinned on New Delhi and Islamabad, but rather sadly, the new 
leadership in India and Pakistan has shown little or no urgency to reach out to the 
24 See for example Feroz Hassan Khan (2012). “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control 
and Confidence Building Measures” in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), The Next Arms Race. Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 357- 386. Also Feroz Hassan Khan (2013). “Strate-
gic Restraint Regime 2.0” in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (eds.), Deterrence Stability and 
Escalation Control in South Asia. Washington, DC.: Henry L. Stimson Center, pp. 161–174.
25 For a detailed analysis, see Feroz Khan and Gurmeet Kanwal (2011). “Building Trust in South 
Asia through Cooperative Retirement of Obsolescent Missiles”. Centre for Land Warfare Stu-
dies, September 4, available at http://www.claws.in/Building-Trust-in-South-Asia-through-
Cooperative-Retirement-of-Obsolescent-Missiles-Gurmeet-Kanwal.html. Also see Zachary 
Davis (2013). “The Yin and Yang of Strategic Transparency” in Michael Krepon and Julia 
Thompson (eds.), Op. Cit., pp. 175–85.
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other. Far from political will or desire to take risks, there is no visible diplomatic 
overture at the time of this writing. The international community has a huge stake 
in bringing the destabilizing trends in nuclear-armed region and in the construction 
of peace and security architecture that could bring conflict resolution between these 
nuclear-armed rivals.
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